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1 Introduction
In this paper we introduce and study the notions of joint games and compatibility in the
context of transferable utility cooperative games. A joint game is defined on the basis of
a few underlying games. Each player in a joint game can take part in at least one of the
underlying games. A coalition can then take advantage of this option and split itself into
sub-coalitions, each participating in a different underlying game. The goal of the coalition is
to find its optimal split, the one that maximizes the total worth of the sub-coalitions in their
respective underlying game. Thus, the worth of a coalition in the joint game is determined
by its optimal split, and is typically greater than in each of the basis games. The aim of this
paper is to formally introduce the notion of a joint game and to find when it has a non-empty
core, which leads us to the notion of compatibility.
Consider, for instance, firms that are capable of producing the same product. Suppose
that these firms operate in different countries, but their productivity and endowment change
across countries. In this case, a consortium of firms can maximize its total output by properly
splitting its members among the countries. The question arises as to whether this consortium
of all the firms could be stable. To study this problem, we associate each country with a
transferable utility cooperative game. In this game, the worth of any coalition is defined as
the maximal production of the coalition if confined to produce in a particular country. This
game is a market game and therefore has a non-empty core. However, on a larger scale, where
firms can operate in different countries, the corresponding game is a joint game, which might
have an empty core. In such a game, the grand coalition, the one that contains all the firms,
typically benefits from the opportunity to operate in different countries. However, smaller
coalitions may benefit as well, and sometimes on a larger scale than the grand coalition. This
could be a source of instability.
Even though the joint game is introduced in a very natural way, its properties cannot be
characterized very easily. It is not clear when the core of a joint game will be non-empty, even
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for very appealing cases when all the games involved are totally balanced or even when they
are all convex. The main results of this paper concern the core of the joint game. Theorems
1 and 2 characterize the joint games which have a non-empty core. It turns out that the
possibility of having sub-coalitions participating in different underlying games might improve
the stability of the grand coalition. In such cases, the underlying games may have empty
cores, while the joint game has a non-empty one. This happens when the opportunity to take
part in different games increases the worth of the grand coalition to a level that could satisfy
all coalitions in a way that would leave no group of players with an incentive to split from
the grand coalition. However, this is not the most general case. It might also be the case
that the underlying games have a non-empty core while the core of the joint game is empty;
this case is illustrated in the motivating example below that deals with market games (see
Section 3). It turns out, however, that in this example, if the choices of the operating firms
are reduced to only two countries, the core remains non-empty (see Theorem 3).
The study of the core of joint games is surprisingly related to a theory that has been
developed in another context, that of decision making. Lehrer [10] and later on Lehrer and
Teper [11] and Even and Lehrer [6] introduced and studied the concave integral, which is
used to compare different possible actions in a world with uncertainty. Whether or not a
joint game has a non-empty core is determined by the concave integrals of the underlying
games, when the latter are interpreted as non-additive probabilities. The Shapley-Bondareva
Theorem [16] characterizes when the core of a game is non-empty; in terms of the concave
integral, it states that the core is non-empty precisely when the integral of the indicator of
the grand coalition2 does not exceed the worth of the grand coalition. The main result of
this paper has the same spirit. It roughly states that the core of a joint game is non-empty
if and only if the sum of the integrals (each is taken with respect to a different basis game)
of functions that sum up to the indicator of the grand coalition does not exceed its worth.
Despite the popularity of the core and the well-established existence of multi-issue in-
2The indicator of the grand coalition is the function defined over it and is equal 1.
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teractions among economic entities, only a few authors have studied the core of combined
games or games with the possibility of membership in more than one coalitions. Bloch and
Clippel [3] look at the core of combined games which are obtained by summing two coalitional
games. They conclude that the set of all balanced transferable payoff games can be divided
into equivalence classes where the core of the combination of two games is equal to the sum
of the cores of the components if and only if the two games belong to the same class, for
example, if both games are convex. Nax [13] studies transferable utility cooperative games
with multiple membership and considers economic environments featuring externalities and
membership in multiple coalitions, he proposes definitions of the core for this class of games.
His definition of the core depends on what assumptions are made about how society reacts
to coalitional deviations. He defines the core for a general conjecture and concludes that the
core of a multiple membership game is the set of contracts that are feasible and un-blockable,
given the conjecture.
To the best of our knowledge there are not many papers in the literature of economic
theory that discuss the idea of multi-issue interaction. However, in the literature of political
economics there are a few papers discussing this issue among which Conconi and Perroni [5],
Abrego et al [1], Horstman et al [8] and Inderst [9] can be named.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the joint game defined over
K different cooperative games and state the results referring to the non-emptiness of the
core, in Section 3 we introduce a motivating example of a joint game and the concept of
compatibility using an example from market games. Section 4 deals with the compatibility
of games including necessary and sufficient conditions for compatibility to hold. In Section 5
we have final comments, proofs are given in the Appendix at the end.
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2 Joint games
2.1 Games with the same grand coalition
Let v1 and v2 be the worths of two transferable utility cooperative games on a finite set of
players N (|N | = n). For all S ⊆ N , v1(S) is the worth of S from participation in v1 and
v2(S) is the worth from participation in v2. For any coalition, S ⊆ N , we suppose that
the members of S can decide to participate in either v1 or v2, with the aim of participation
being to maximize the worth of the coalition. In mathematical terms, let S1 and S2 be two
exhaustive and mutually disjoint subsets of S ⊆ N (S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, S1 ∪ S2 = S). The whole
coalition S is looking for a partition {S∗1 , S∗2} such that,
v1(S
∗
1) + v2(S
∗
2) = max
S1∩S2=∅
S1∪S2=S
[v1(S1) + v2(S2)]. (2.1)
Here the coalition has the opportunity to collect a better value by assigning its members to
participate in an appropriate game. We can generalize the same argument for K different
games v1, ..., vK . Hence, we define a new worth as follows:
Definition 1 A joint cooperative game for v1, ..., vK defined over N ,is a cooperative game
whose worth is defined as
v1 • ... • vK(S) = max
S1,...,SK
∀i 6=j, Si∩Sj=∅,
S1∪...∪SK=S
v1(S1) + ...+ vK(SK). (2.2)
Here we recall the definition of the core for coalitional games:
Definition 2 The core of a coalitional game with transferable payoffs 〈N, v〉 is the set of all
payoff profiles, (xi)i∈N , such that x(N) = v(N) and for any coalition S, x(S) ≥ v(S), where
x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi.
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2} and define the following games: v1(1) = .9, v1(2) = .2, v1(N) =
4
1, and v2(1) = .2, v2(2) = .9, v2(N) = 1. The joint game, v1 • v2, is additive: v1 • v2(1) =
.9, v1•v2(2) = .9, v1•v2(N) = 1.8. While C(v1) = C(v2) = ∅, the joint game has a non-empty
core, C(v1 • v2) = {(.9, .9)}. This simple example illustrates the typical case that in the joint
game the worths of all coalitions are larger than in each of the underlying games. In this case
the improvement in the worth of the grand coalition is high enough to satisfy all coalitions,
making the core of the joint game non-empty.
Remark 1 It is worth mentioning that if we denote the set of all coalitional games on N
by G(N), then (G(N), •) has an Abelian semi-group structure. That is, • is a commutative,
associative operator from G(N) × G(N) to G(N). The example shows that we cannot easily
replace G(N) with a smaller set of games (e.g., the set of games with empty cores) and still
retain the same algebraic structure.
2.2 Extension to games with different grand coalitions
One might argue that in real world situations, some players can play in one place but not in
another. Let (v1, N1), ..., (vK , NK) be K cooperative games, where the grand coalition of vi
is Ni, i = 1, ...,K. Similar to the definition above, we introduce the joint game as follows.
Definition 3 A joint cooperative game for (v1, N1), ..., (vK , NK) is a cooperative game whose
grand coalition is N = N1 ∪ ... ∪NK and is defined as
v1 • ... • vK(S) = max
Si⊆Ni, i=1,...,K
∀i 6=j, Si∩Sj=∅,
S1∪...∪SK=S
v1(S1) + ...+ vK(SK), (2.3)
for every S ⊆ N .
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3 A motivating example
In this section we motivate the discussions in the paper, in particular the notions of joint
games and compatibility, with an example from market games. Our example follows the
same notation for market games as in Osborne and Rubinstein [14]. Consider a firm with
n units, denoted by 1, ..., n, which can operate in K different countries c1, ..., cK . In country
ci, unit j produces according to production function fij that uses m production factors and
an endowment of eij ∈ Rm+ . For a moment let us focus on one country, say ci. For any
S ⊆ {1, ..., n}, denote the aggregate endowment ∑
j∈S
eij by e
i
S . The optimal production can
be regarded as a coalitional game: the worth of S in ci is defined as,
vi(S) = max
(xj)
j∈S∈F(eiS)
∑
j∈S
fij(x
j), (3.1)
where F(eiS) is the feasibility set defined as
F(eiS) =
(xj)j∈S
∣∣∣∣xj ≥ 0 , j ∈ S ,∑
j∈S
xj = eiS
.
Now to be more specific we consider three firms operating in three different countries. We
assume that the production function of firm j in country ci, i.e., fij , is a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion with two inputs, x and y: fij(x, y) = Aij
√
xy, where Aij is the Total Factor Productivity
(hence TFP). We assume that the aggregate endowment in each country is one unit of each
input; for instance, in country c1, the endowments of firms 1, 2 and 3 are (0, 0), (2/3, 2/3)
and (1/3, 1/3), respectively. To make things even simpler, we further assume that it is not
feasible for firm j to produce in country cj , and therefore, Ajj = 0. The following table
summarizes the endowments of each firm in each country and its TFP.3,
3In the third row of the table e denotes the two dimensional vector (e, e).
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Country 1 2 3
Firm 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
TFP 0 1/3 1 1 0 1/3 1/3 1 0
Endowment 0 2/3 1/3 1/3 0 2/3 2/3 1/3 0
The game v1 is given as follows,
v1(1) = max
(x11,x
1
2)=(0,0)
0 = 0,
v1(2) = max
(x21,x
2
2)=(2/3,2/3)
(1/3)
√
x21x
2
2 = 2/9,
v1(3) = max
(x31,x
3
2)=(1/3,1/3)
√
x31x
3
2 = 1/3,
v1(2, 3) = max
(x21+x
3
1,x
2
2+x
3
2)=(1,1)
(1/3)
√
x21x
2
2 +
√
x31x
3
2 = 1,
v1(1, 3) = max
(x11+x
3
1,x
1
2+x
3
2)=(1/3,1/3)
0 +
√
x31x
3
2 = 1/3,
v1(1, 2) = max
(x11+x
2
1,x
1
2+x
2
2)=(2/3,2/3)
0 + (1/3)
√
x21x
2
2 = 2/9,
v1(1, 2, 3) = max
(x11+x
2
1+x
3
1,x
1
2+x
2
2+x
3
2)=(1,1)
0 + (1/3)
√
x21x
2
2 +
√
x31x
3
2 = 1.
The following table summarizes the games v1, v2 and v3 corresponding to the three countries,
Coalition (1) (2) (3) (2,3) (1,3) (1,2) (1,2,3)
v1 0 2/9 1/3 1 1/3 2/9 1
v2 1/3 0 2/9 2/9 1 1/3 1
v3 2/9 1/3 0 1/3 2/9 1 1
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We now turn to the joint games. We first consider the joint game v1 • v2 and show how, for
instance, v1 • v2(2, 3) is computed.
v1 • v2(2, 3) = max{v1(2) + v2(3), v1(3) + v2(2), v1(2, 3), v2(2, 3)} = 1.
The values of v1 • v2 for different coalitions are given in the following table.
Coalition (1) (2) (3) (2,3) (1,3) (1,2) (1,2,3)
v1 • v2 1/3 2/9 1/3 1 1 5/9 4/3
The cores of the games v1•v2, v2•v3 and v1•v3 are non-empty. For instance, (3/9, 2/9, 7/9) ∈
C(v1 • v2). However, the core of v = v1 • v2 • v3 is empty. The table of v is the following:
Coalition (1) (2) (3) (2,3) (1,3) (1,2) (1,2,3)
v 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 1 1 4/3
Now let us take a closer look at this example. Observe that when the firms get access to
a new market the worth of each coalition cannot decrease. Therefore, by having access to a
new market, firms’ core allocations should be at least what they would receive without it.
A simple argument shows that C(v1•v2) = {(1/3, x, 1−x)| 2/9 ≤ x ≤ 1/3}. In particular,
in any core allocation firms 1 and 2 should receive at most 1/3+1/3 = 2/3. Now assume that
access to c3 becomes available. Since v1•v2•v3(1, 2, 3) = v1•v2(1, 2, 3), the core C(v1•v2•v3)
should be a subset of C(v1 • v2). Thus, in any core allocation of the former, firms 1 and 2
cannot receive more than 2/3. However, with access to c3, the worth of coalition (1, 2) is 1,
which implies that the core of v1 • v2 • v3 is empty.
On the other hand, access to a new country can again change the situation. Suppose
further that the firms have access to country 4 whose figures are described in the following
table.
8
Country 4
Firm 1 2 3
TFP 0 1/6 2
Endowment 0 5/6 1/6
The game v4 and the joint game are given in the following table.
Coalition (1) (2) (3) (2,3) (1,3) (1,2) (1,2,3)
v4 0 5/36 1/3 2 1/3 5/36 2
v1 • v2 • v3 • v4 1/3 1/3 1/3 2 1 1 7/3
Observe that (1/3, 1, 1) ∈ C(v1 • v2 • v3 • v4). Thus, the core of the joint game v1 • v2 • v3 • v4
is non-empty.
Remark 2 As one can see, even though the cores of v1 •v2 and v3 are non-empty, their joint
game v1 • v2 • v3 has an empty core, which is opposite to example 1.
4 Compatibility of games
4.1 Compatibility
In this section we introduce the notion of compatibility. We say that games are compatible
with each other if the core of the joint game is non-empty. This means that regardless of the
stability of each individual game, the joint game is stable.
Definition 4 The games (v1, N1), ..., (vK , NK) are compatible if
C(v1 • ... • vK) 6= ∅.
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In the following we state a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core
of a joint cooperative game, v1 • ... • vK . For this purpose we introduce a concave integral
for games (see Lehrer [10]). For two games v1, v2, by v1 ≥ v2, we mean v1(S) ≥ v2(S), for all
sets S ⊆ N . A game P is called additive if P (S ∪ T ) = P (S) + P (T ), for two disjoint sets
S, T ⊆ N .
Definition 5 For a game v and a vector X ≥ 0 in Rn, the concave integral is defined as
follows: ∫ cav
Xdv = min
P≥v
∫
XdP, (4.1)
where the minimum is taken over all additive games, P , such that P (S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N .
Remark 3 (i) The concave integral is defined as the minimum over a set of additive games.
This minimum (as opposed to infimum) is justified because the set of the additive games P
such that P ≥ v can be restricted, without loss of generality, to a bounded set, say Pv. In
other words, the concave integral can be defined as an infimum over a compact set of additive
games, and therefore the infimum is attained.
(ii) The minimum min
P∈Pv
∫
XdP is obtained in an extreme point of Pv. Moreover, the set Pv
is defined by a finite number of linear inequalities, which makes Pv a polyhedron. As such, it
has a finite number of extreme points. We conclude that the concave integral is the minimum
of finitely many linear functions (the extreme points of Pv), and is therefore continuous.
Remark 4 If v is additive, then
∫ cav
Xdv =
∫
Xdv, which is why we can equally use∫ cav
Xdv or
∫
Xdv when working with additive games.
There is a dual approach to calculating
∫ cav
Xdv; the variable X can be decomposed as a
linear combination of indicators. Clearly, X can be decomposed in many ways and among all
the decompositions X =
∑
S⊆N αS · 1S , where αS ≥ 0 for every S ⊆ N , the concave integral
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considers the one that maximizes
∑
S⊆N αSv(S). Formally,
4
∫ cav
Xdv = max
{ ∑
S⊆N
αSv(S);
∑
S⊆N
αS · 1S = X, αS ≥ 0 for every S ⊆ N
}
. (4.2)
Remark 5 Since our analysis is in finite spaces, one may wonder why we use the notation
∫
in Definition 5 and Eq. (4.1). We have two reasons. First, we want to use standard notations
used in the literature, such as the concave integral and the Choquet integral [4] (see below).
Second, the integrals used here are indeed sums, but their domains change from one X to the
other. That is, different X’s might have different decompositions that attain the maximum
in Eq.(4.2). These different domains are concisely captured by the integral notation.
The classical definition of the totally balanced cover of a game v is
Bv(T ) := max
{∑
S⊆T
αSv(S);
∑
S⊆T
αS · 1S = 1T , αS ≥ 0 for every S ⊆ T
}
for every T ⊆ N.
Note that due to Eq. (4.2), the totally balanced cover of v can be written also as,
Bv(T ) =
∫ cav
1Tdv for every T ⊆ N. (4.3)
One can now use the notion of the concave integral to re-state the Shapley-Bondareva
Theorem (see [16]): For any game v,
C(v) 6= ∅ if and only if Bv(N) ≤ v(N). (4.4)
Example 2 Consider v1 in the previous example. There is an additive game which is the least
of all additive games that satisfies P (S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N : P (1) = 0.9, P (2) = 0.2, P (N) =
4A similar formula has been used in [17] to show that every totally-balanced game is a market game.
11
1.1. Let X = (3, 2). Then,
∫ cav
Xdv1 = 3 · 0.9 + 2 · 0.2 = 3.1. As for the dual approach,
the decomposition that maximizes the right hand side of Eq. (4.2) with respect to v1 is X =
3 ·1{1}+2 ·1{2}. Indeed, 3v1(1)+2v1(1) = 3.1 =
∫ cav
Xdv1. Note that X could be decomposed
differently. For instance, X = 2 · 1N + 1{2}. But then, 2v1(N) + v1(1) = 2 · 1 + 0.9 = 2.9
which is strictly smaller than
∫ cav
Xdv1.
The following two theorems are the main results of this paper.
Theorem 1 The games v1, ..., vK defined over the same grand coalition N are compatible if
and only if the following inequality holds
max
f1+...+fK=1
fi:N→R+
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fidvi ≤ v1 • ... • vK(N). (4.5)
Proof See appendix. 
In order to characterize when games defined over different grand coalitions are compatible,
we need some additional notation. Let (v1, N1), ..., (vK , NK) be K cooperative games. Define,
N = N1 ∪ ... ∪NK and
Fi = {fi : N → R+; fi(`) = 0 whenever ` 6∈ Ni}.
For fi ∈ Fi denote by fi|Ni : Ni → R+ the restriction of fi to Ni. That is, the function
defined on Ni and coincides there with fi. The next theorem generalizes Theorem 1 to games
that might have different grand coalitions. Its proof hinges on that of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 The games (v1, N1), ..., (vK , NK) are compatible if and only if the following in-
equality holds,
max
f1+...+fK=1
fi∈Fi, i=1,...,K
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fi|Nidvi ≤ v1 • ... • vK(N). (4.6)
Proof See appendix. 
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Definition 6 A cooperative game, v, is a convex game if for two subsets S1, S2,
v(S1 ∩ S2) + v(S1 ∪ S2) ≥ v(S1) + v(S2). (4.7)
Remark 6 The game v has a large core [18] if for every S ⊆ N and for every additive game
Q that satisfies v ≤ Q, there is P in the core of v such that P ≤ Q. It is shown in [2] that v
has a large core if and only if
∫ cav
Xdv = min
P∈C(v)
∫
XdP. (4.8)
In other words, when v has a large core, the minimum in (4.1) can be taken over the core
of v which is smaller than the set of all additive games that are greater than or equal to v.
Furthermore, as noted in [2], any convex game has a large core.
A non-trivial application of Theorem 2 is the following theorem:
Theorem 3 If (v1, N1), (v2, N2) are convex games, then they are compatible.
Proof See appendix. 
The following example shows that more than two convex games might be non-compatible.
Example 3 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and define three monotonic simple games. For each i = 1, 2, 3
the game vi has one mimimal winning coalition, N \ {i}. Since there is only one winning
coalition, vi is convex. Consider now v = v1 • v2 • v3. It is also a simple game, and v(S) = 1
if and only if |S| ≥ 2. It implies that the core of v is empty, rendering v1, v2 and v3 non-
compatible.
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5 Final comments
5.1 Another sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the joint game’s
core
In this section we introduce another sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the joint
game’s core.
Example 4 Let N = {1, 2}, v1 be a game where v1(1) = 1, v1(2) = .8 and v1(N) = 2.
Also let v2(1) = .9, v2(2) = .9 and v2(N) = 2. The cores of the two games have at least
one member in common and v1 • v2 has a non-empty core. If we replace v2 by v′2, where
v′2(1) = .8, v′2(2) = 1.1 and leave v′2(N) = 2, then the cores of v1 and v′2 are disjoint, and the
core of v1 • v′2 is empty.
The following proposition states that, in this example, the linkage between the non-
emptiness of the core of the joint game and the fact that the cores of the underlying games
have at least one member in common is not coincidental.
Proposition 1 Let v1, ..., vK be a set of games on the same grand coalition N such that
v1(N) = ... = vK(N). Then, v1 • ... • vK(N) = v1(N) if and only if C(v1 • ... • vK) =
C(v1) ∩ ... ∩ C(vK).
Proof See appendix. 
This proposition implies in particular that when v1(N) = ... = vK(N) = v1 • ... • vK(N),
if there is a core allocation that is common to all games, then the core of the joint game is
not empty.
An application of this theorem is for simple games. Let v1, ..., vK be K simple games, each
having a non-empty core. Let us denote the set of veto players (the intersection of all the
winning coalitions) of game i by Ui. Then it is known that C(vi) = {P ≥ 0|P (j) = 0 , ∀j ∈
U ci }. Therefore C(v1) ∩ ... ∩ C(vK) = {P ≥ 0|P (j) = 0, j ∈ U c1 ∪ ... ∪ U cK}. Therefore, by
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using Proposition 1 one can see that v1 • ... • vK is a simple game with the veto players being
U1 ∩ ... ∩UK . On the other hand, there is no player who is a veto player in all games, if and
only if the core of the joint game is empty.
5.2 Joint games and the least super-additive majorant
From a technical point of view, the definition of a joint game can be considered as a gener-
alization of the notion ‘least super-additive majorant’ introduced in [17]. If v is a game then
a least super-additive majorant is introduced as
v˜(S) = max
∑
Si∩Sj=∅
S1∪...∪Sn=S
v(Si). (5.1)
The game v˜ is the smallest super-additive game that dominates v. This concept was first
introduced in [17], and was used to study the core of super-additive games. This concept
was not later studied because it was not found to be helpful. Here we revisit this concept
and put the definition in a correct direction within the context of joint games.
Note that v˜ = v • ... • v︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
. Now assume that in Eq. (5.1) one could arbitrarily choose games
among the set {(v1, N1), ..., (vK , NK)}. The result would be,
max
∑
Si⊆Ni
∀i 6=j,Si∩Sj=∅
S1∪...∪Sn=S
vi∈{v1,...,vK}
vi(Si). (5.2)
This quantity is equal to v˜1 • ... • v˜K(S). Thus, joint games are generalizations of least
super-additive majorant games.
Given that this paper assumes that a coalition, S, can be split into different partitions,
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one may wonder how we explain the choice of (2.3) over the following alternative:
v1 • ... • vK(S) = max
Si⊆Ni
∀i 6=j, Si∩Sj=∅,
S1∪...∪SK=S
v˜1(S1) + ...+ v˜K(SK). (5.3)
Indeed the definition in (5.3) can be accommodated by (2.3): it is the joint game for a set
of the corresponding super-majorant games. We note that (5.3) cannot accommodate (2.3),
meaning that (5.3) cannot be as general as (2.3). The definition we adopt, (that given in
(2.3)) would make better sense than that given in (5.3) in cases where a coalition Si that
decides to be in the environment of (vi, Ni) cannot be further split: its worth is vi(Si) and
not v˜i(Si).
One can regard ∼ as an operator on G(N) (family of all games on N). As it was dis-
cussed earlier (G(N), •) has a semi-group structure. It is interesting that the operator ∼ is
distributive on (G(N), •) as it is shown in the following proposition
Proposition 2 The operator ∼: G → G is distributive i.e., for any set Let v1, ..., vK of games
on the same grand coalition N we have
˜v1 • ... • vK = v˜1 • ... • v˜K .
Proof See Appendix. 
A natural extension, which is related to our discussion in this section, is to extend the
definition of compatibility by using c-cores. Let v be game. We introduce the game vc as
follows,
vc(S) =
v(S) S 6= Nv˜(N) S = N . (5.4)
The core of vc is known as the c-core and is denoted by Cc(v). This concept was first in-
troduced in [7] and further studied in [19]. Now we can introduce the notion of c-compatibility
for K games, v1, ..., vK , on the same grand coalition N as:
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Cc(v1 • ... • vK) 6= ∅.
The following result links c-compatibility to the compatibility of the least super-additive
majorant,
Proposition 3 Let v1, ..., vK be a set of games with the same grand coalition N . Then,
v1, ..., vK are c-compatible if and only if v˜1, ..., v˜K are compatible.
Proof See Appendix. 
5.3 A concluding remark
In this paper we have introduced the concept of a joint game and have developed testable
conditions for determining whether or not its core is empty. In a joint game it is typically
better for the grand coalition to split into sub-coalitions and hence obtain a total value which
is greater than the value of the grand coalition in the underlying games. We characterized
when the core of the joint game is non-empty.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1 We prove that the games v1, ..., vK are compatible if and only if
max
f1+...+fK=1
fi:N→R+
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fidvi ≤ v1 • ... • vK(N) (6.1)
in six steps.
Step 1: Suppose that u(X) = inf
P∈Q
∫
XdP , where Q is a comprehensive,5 convex and closed
set of additive games. We show that u(X) = −∞ whenever one of the coordinates of X is
negative. Indeed, let X = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Rn such that xr0 < 0, for some 1 ≤ r0 ≤ n, and let
P = (p1, ..., pn) ∈ Q. For any λ > 0, define an additive game P λ = (pλ1 , ..., pλn) as pλr = pr if
r 6= r0, and pλr0 = pr0 + λ. Since Q is comprehensive, P λ ∈ Q. Therefore,
u(X) = min
P∈Q
∫
XdP ≤
∫
XdP λ =
∫
XdP + λxr0 ,
which tends to −∞ when λ→∞.
Step 2: Suppose that ui(X) = inf
Pi∈Qi
∫
XdPi, for i = 1, ..,K, where Qi is a comprehensive
5Q is a comprehensive if P ∈ Q and P ′ ≥ P , then P ′ ∈ Q.
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set of additive games. The convolution of u1, ..., uK , denoted u1 ? ... ? uK , is defined as
u1 ? ... ? uK(X) := sup
{(Xl)Kl=1∈(Rn)K |X1+...+XK=X}
u1(X1) + ...+ uK(XK).
We claim that
u1 ? ... ? uK(X) = inf
P∈∩iQi
∫
XdP.
In order to prove this claim we use convex analysis. Consider a set of convex functions
f1, ..., fK from Rn to R ∪ {+∞}, whose conjugates are defined as
f∗i (P ) = sup
X∈Rn
{∫
XdP − fi(X)
}
, i = 1, ...,K.
The infimal convolution of these K functions is
h(X) = inf
{(Xl)Kl=1∈(Rn)K |X1+...+XK=X}
{f(X1) + ...+ f(XK)}.
We state the following version of Theorem 20, d) in [15] to be used later.
Theorem 4 Suppose that ∃X¯ ∈ Rn and M ∈ R such that the set
K :=
{
(X1, ..., XK) ∈ (Rn)K
∣∣∣∣∣ X1 + ...+XK = X¯,f1(X1) + ...+ fK(XK) ≤M
}
(6.2)
is non-empty and bounded. Then, h∗ = f∗1 + ...+ f∗K .
Let fi = −ui. We verify that the condition of Theorem 4 is satisfied. Take X¯ = −→0 and
M = 0. First, for every i = 1, ...,K Qi is comprehensive and therefore, fi is non-positive
on Rn+. In particular, fi(X¯) ≤ 0, implying that X¯K := (X¯, ..., X¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
K times
) ∈ K. Second, according
to Step 1, K ⊆ (Rn+)K . This implies that X¯K is the only point in K, meaning that K is
non-empty and bounded.
Having verified the condition of Theorem 4, we proceed to apply it to fi. By the definition
of the conjugate function, f∗i (Q) = sup
X∈Rn
{∫
XdQ+ ui(X)
}
. Since for all λ > 0, ui(λX) =
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λui(X), we heve
f∗i (Q) = sup
X∈Rn
{∫
XdQ+ ui(X)
}
= sup
λX∈Rn
{∫
λXdQ+ ui(λX)
}
= λ sup
X∈Rn
{∫
XdQ+ ui(X)
}
= λf∗i (Q).
This implies that either f∗i (Q) = 0 or f
∗
i (Q) = +∞.
We now elaborate on (f∗1 + ... + f∗K)(P ). If P is such that for any i,−P ∈ Qi, then by∫
XdP + ui(X) ≤
∫
XdP − ∫ XdP = 0 we have f∗i (P ) = 0. On the other hand, if there
exists i such that− P 6∈ Qi, then due to the assumption that Qi is convex and closed, there
is a unique R ∈ Qi such that R is the closest point (in the Euclidean norm) to −P in Qi.
Let, X := −P −R 6= 0. The integral ∫ Xd(−P )− ∫ XdR′ is bounded away from 0 for every
R′ ∈ Qi. Thus, f∗i (−P ) = +∞. This implies that f∗1 + ...+ f∗K is zero iff −P ∈ ∩Ki=1Qi and
+∞ otherwise. That is,
(f∗1 + ...+ f
∗
K)(P ) =

0, if − P ∈
K⋂
i=1
Qi
+∞ , otherwise
. (6.3)
Now define, g(X) = − inf
P∈−
K⋂
i=1
Qi
∫
XdP . Since,
K⋂
i=1
Qi is a comprehensive, convex and closed
set, the same argument just used implies that g∗ is equal to (6.3). Using Theorem 4 we
conclude that h∗ = f∗1 + ... + f∗K = g
∗. Since, h and g are both lower semi-continuous
functions, it implies that they are equal (see [15]). Thus, h(X) = − inf
−P∈
K⋂
i=1
Qi
∫
XdP , which
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implies,
u1 ? ... ? uK(X) = sup
{(Xl)Kl=1∈(Rn)K |X1+...+XK=X}
u1(X1) + ...+ uK(XK)
= inf
{(Xl)Kl=1∈(Rn)K |X1+...+XK=X}
{f(X1) + ...+ f(XK)}
= h(X) = − inf
−P∈
K⋂
i=1
Qi
∫
XdP = inf
P∈
K⋂
i=1
Qi
∫
XdP,
which proves our claim.
Step 3: For a set of games vi, i = 1, ...,K, and any additive game P it is easy to see that
P (S) ≥ v1 • ... • vK(S), ∀S ⊆ N iff P (S) ≥ vi(S), ∀S ⊆ N , ∀i = 1, ...,K.
Step 4: Consider the games v1, ..., vK and the functions ui(X) = inf
P∈Qi
∫
XdP , where Qi
is the set of all additive games P such that P ≥ vi. Qi is comprehensive, convex and closed,
and therefore Step 1 applies. By the definition of the ? operator and Step 1 (ui(Xi) = −∞
for every Xi 6∈ Rn+), for X ≥ 0 we therefore have,(∫ cav
· dv1 ? ... ?
∫ cav
· dvK
)
(X) = max
X1+...+XK=X
∀i,Xi≥0
∫ cav
X1dv1 + ... +
∫ cav
XKdvK .
Note that the maximum is replacing the supremum because all concave functions, by Remark
3, are continuous and the set
{
(Xi)
K
i=1|X1 + ...+XK = X,∀i,Xi ≥ 0
}
is compact.
Step 5: For every S ⊆ N , the following equality holds,
Bv1•...•vK (S) = max
f1+...+fK=1S
∀i,fi≥0
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fidvi.
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Indeed, ∫ cav
Xd(v1 • ... • vK) = min
P≥v1•...•vK
∫ cav
XdP
= min
∩{P≥vi}
∫
XdP
=
(∫ cav
· dv1 ? ... ?
∫ cav
· dvK
)
(X)
= max
X1+...+XK=X
∀i,Xi≥0
∫ cav
X1dv1 + ...+
∫ cav
XKdvK .
In the first equality we use the definition of the concave integral, in the second equality we use
Step 3, in the third we use Step 2 and in the fourth equality we use Step 4. Using X = 1S ,
we get the result.
Step 6: Given Step 5 and (4.4) we have,
C(v1 • ... • vK) 6= ∅ ⇔ Bv1•...•vK (N) ≤ v1 • ... • vK(N)
⇔ max
f1+...+fK=1
∀i,fi≥0
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fidvi ≤ v1 • ... • vK(N).
Proof of Theorem 2 Let (v1, N1), ..., (vK , NK) be K games and recall that we have defined
N = N1 ∪ ... ∪NK . We show first that if (v1, N1), ..., (vK , NK) are compatible then,
max
f1+...+fK=1
fi∈Fi, i=1,...,K
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fi|Nidvi ≤ v1 • ... • vK(N).
Suppose that f1 + ... + fK = 1, where fi ∈ Fi, i = 1, ...,K and that
∫ cav
fi|Nidvi =∑ri
j=1 vi(S
j
i ), where S
j
i ⊆ Ni and
∑ri
j=1 1Sji
= fi. Then,
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fi|Nidvi =
∑
1≤i≤K
∑ri
j=1 vi(S
j
i ) ≤
v1 • ... • vK(N). The inequality holds because
∑
1≤i≤K
∑ri
j=1 1Sji
= f1 + ...+ fK = 1N .
As for the inverse direction, for any positive number, M , and i = 1, ..,K, define the game
(vMi , N) as follows.
vMi (S) = v
M
i (S ∩Ni)− |S \Ni| ·M.
The worth vMi (S) coincides with vi(S) as long as S ⊆ Ni. Any player out of Ni is worth
−M , which is also her contribution to any coalition in Ni. When M is sufficiently large,
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in order to obtain vM1 • ... • vMK (S), it is optimal to split S as S = S1 ∪ ... ∪ SK , where
for any i, Si ⊆ Ni. Since there are finitely many coalitions in N , for sufficiently large M ,
vM1 • ... • vMK (S) = v1 • ... • vK(S) for every S ⊆ N . It implies that (v1, N1), ..., (vK , NK) are
compatible whenever (vM1 , N1), ..., (v
M
K , NK) are.
We now use Theorem 1 and apply it to (vM1 , N1), ..., (v
M
K , NK). Theorem 1 states that
these games are compatible if and only if,
max
f1+...+fK=1
fi:N→R+
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fidv
M
i ≤ vM1 • ... • vMK (N). (6.4)
We claim that for M large enough,
max
f1+...+fK=1
∀i,fi:N→R+
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fidv
M
i = max
f1+...+fK=1
∀i,fi∈Fi
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fidv
M
i . (6.5)
We show first that for every fi : N → R+, i = 1, ...,K that satisfy f1 + ...+ fK = 1 there
are f ′i ∈ Fi, i = 1, ...,K that satisfy f1 + ...+ fK = 1 and M sufficient large such that,∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
f ′idv
M
i ≥
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fidv
M
i . (6.6)
Suppose that fi : N → R+, i = 1, ...,K satisfy f1 + ... + fK = 1 and that there are j and
` 6∈ Nj with fj(`) > 0. Denote by fi1Ni the function that coincides with fi on Ni and is equal
to 0 out of Ni. Note that
∫ cav
fidv
M
i =
∫ cav
fi1Nidvi−M
∑
`6∈Ni fi(`). For every ` ∈ N there
is an index i(`) such that ` ∈ Ni(`). For every i define,
f ′i = fi1Ni +
∑
`; i(`)=i
∑
j=1,...,K
s.t. ` 6∈Nj
fj(`).
The function f ′i is 0 on ` 6∈ Ni. Therefore, f ′i ∈ Fi. Moreover, on ` ∈ Ni, f ′i(`) ≥ fi(`) with
strict inequality when there is j such that fj(`) > 0, ` 6∈ Nj and i(`) = i. In the latter case
f ′i(`) is getting the total value of all fj(`) for which ` 6∈ Nj . It is clear that f ′1 + ...+ f ′K = 1.
Regarding the left hand side (LHS) of (6.6), note that since f ′i ∈ Fi,
∫ cav
f ′idv
M
i =∫ cav
f ′i|Nidvi, meaning that it does not depend on M , and therefore the LHS does not depend
on M as well.
24
On the right hand side (RHS) note that
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fidv
M
i ≤
∑
i 6=j
∫ cav
fi1Nidvi +
∫ cav
fj1Njdvj − fj(`)M,
which tends to −∞ as M → ∞. We obtain that for M large enough, the LHS is strictly
greater than the RHS. Note that the M we found depends on the functions f1, ..., fK under
discussion. However, due to the fact that the convex integral is continuous and that the set
{(f1, ..., fK); ∀i, fi, N → R+, f1 + ...+ fK = 1} is compact, we conclude that there is one M
such that Eq. (6.5) holds, as desired.
We obtain that there is M large enough such that (by Eqs. (6.4 and (6.5)), v1, ...vK are
compatible if and only if,
max
f1+...+fK=1
∀i,fi∈Fi
∑
1≤i≤K
∫ cav
fidv
M
i ≤ vM1 • ... • vMK (N). (6.7)
However, for M > 0 when fi ∈ Fi,
∫ cav
fidv
M
i =
∫ cav
fidvi. Moreover, when M is sufficiently
large vM1 • ... • vMK (N) = v1 • ... • vK(N). This implies Eq. (4.6) and the proof of Theorem 2
is complete.
Proof of Theorem 3 Let (v1, N1), (v2, N2) be convex games.
Step 1: We first assume that N1 = N2. Denote by C(vi) the core of vi. Since vi is convex,
by Remark 6, ∫ cav
Xdvi = min
P∈C(vi)
∫ cav
XdP , X ≥ 0.
We therefore have,
max
f1+f2=1
f1,f2≥0
∑
i
∫ cav
fidvi = max
f1+f2=1
f1,f2≥0
∑
i
min
Pi∈C(vi)
∫ cav
fidPi (6.8)
= max
f1+f2=1
f1,f2≥0
min
(Pi)i∈C(v1)×C(v2)
∑
i
∫ cav
fidPi
= min
(Pi)i∈C(v1)×C(v2)
max
f1+f2=1
f1,f2≥0
∑
i
∫ cav
fidPi,
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where the last equality is obtained by using the Minimax Theorem, as explained in what
follows. Consider the zero-sum game in which Player 1’s set of strategies is {f1 + f2 =
1, f1, f2 ≥ 0} and C(v1) × C(v2) is Player 2’s set of strategies. Both sets are compact.
Finally, the payoff function ((Pi)i, (fi)i) 7→
∑
i
∫
fidPi is bilinear. The Minimax Theorem
allows us now to change the order of the minimum and the maximum in order to obtain the
last equality.
Let (P ∗1 , P ∗2 ) and (f∗1 , f∗2 ) be the optimal strategies of the players. In particular, (f∗1 , f∗2 )
solves the maximization problem in the LHS of Eq. (6.8).
For every j ∈ N , denote6 M(j) = {i; P ∗i (j) ≥ P ∗−i(j)} = argmaxi=1,2P ∗i (j). When
i ∈M(j), P ∗i (j) is greater than or equal to P ∗−i(j). Since (f∗1 , f∗2 ) solves
max
f1+f2=1
f1,f2≥0
∑
i
∫ cav
fidP
∗
i , (6.9)
we infer that if f∗i (j) > 0, then i ∈ M(j). Indeed, if i 6∈ M(j), then P ∗−i(j) > P ∗i (j). Define
now, f ′i(j
′) = f∗i (j
′), f ′−i(j
′) = f∗−i(j
′) for every j′ 6= j, f ′i(j) = 0 and f ′−i(j) = f∗−i(j) + f∗i (j).
One obtains that f ′1 and f ′2 are non-negative, f ′1 + f ′2 = 1 and,∑
i
∫ cav
f∗i dP
∗
i <
∑
i
∫ cav
f ′idP
∗
i ,
a contradiction. Furthermore, any two non-negative functions, f ′1 and f ′2, such that f ′1+f ′2 =
1 and that satisfy the implication [f ′i(j) > 0⇒ i ∈M(j)] solve Eq. (6.9).
Claim: There are two disjoint sets S1 and S2 such that S1 ∪ S2 = N (i.e., 1S1 + 1S2 = 1)
and
(a) j ∈ Si implies i ∈M(j) for every j ∈ N and i = 1, 2;
(b)
∫
1SidP
∗
i = P
∗
i (Si) = vi(Si).
Before we prove the claim we argue that (a) and (b) together would complete the proof.
Indeed, by the previous paragraph, (a) would imply that (1S1 ,1S2) solves Eq. (6.9). (b)
6−i denotes 3− i.
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would imply that
∑
i
∫
1SidP
∗
i (j) =
∑
i vi(Si). Together we would obtain
max
f1+f2=1
f1,f2≥0
∑
i
∫ cav
fidvi =
∑
i
∫ cav
f∗i dvi =
∑
i
∫ cav
f∗i dP
∗
i
=
∑
i
∫ cav
1SidP
∗
i =
∑
i
vi(Si) ≤ v1 • v2(N).
Theorem 1 implies that v1 and v2 are compatible.
Proof of the claim: The game vi is convex and therefore the concave integral takes a special
form. Let pii be a permutation over N such that f
∗
i (pii(1)) ≤ f∗i (pii(2)) ≤ ... ≤ f∗i (pii(n)).
Define Ai(j) = {j′ ∈ N ; f∗i (j′) ≥ f∗i (pii(j))}. It is clear that Ai(n) ⊆ Ai(n−1) ⊆ ... ⊆ Ai(1).
Note that f∗i attains its maximum on the set Ai(n) and Ai(1) = N . By[12],
7
∫ cav
f∗i dvi =
n∑
j=1
(
f∗i (pii(j))− f∗i (pii(j − 1))
)
vi(Ai(j)),
where f∗i (pii(0)) = 0.
Recall that f∗1 + f∗2 = 1.
Case 1: max f∗1 < 1. Then, min f∗2 > 0 implies 2 ∈ M(j),∀j, and therefore A2(1) = N . In
this case set S1 = ∅ and S2 = N . Properties (a) and (b) are satisfied and the proof of the
Claim is complete.
Case 2: max f∗2 < 1. This is similar to the previous case.
Case 3: max f∗1 = max f∗2 = 1. Denote by j∗ the smallest index such that f∗2 is strictly
positive on A2(j
∗) (it exists because otherwise, f∗2 = 0 contradicting max f∗2 = 1). Note that
the complement of A2(j
∗) is the set where f∗2 = 0, which is precisely where f∗1 = 1, namely
A1(n). Define, S1 = A1(n) and S2 = A2(j
∗). The sets S1 and S2 are complements of one
another. Moreover, (a) is satisfied (because j ∈ Si implies that f∗i (j) is positive and therefore
in M(i)).
We now show that (b) is satisfied. As (P ∗1 , P ∗2 ) and (f∗1 , f∗2 ) are the optimal strategies
7This is also known as the Choquet integral [4].
27
we have
2∑
i=1
∫ cav
f∗i dvi =
2∑
i=1
∫
f∗i dP
∗
i
=
2∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(
f∗i (pii(j))− f∗i (pii(j − 1))
)
P ∗i (Ai(j))
≥
2∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(
f∗i (pii(j))− f∗i (pii(j − 1))
)
vi(Ai(j)) =
2∑
i=1
∫ cav
f∗i dvi,
where the inequality is due to the fact that P ∗i is in the core of vi. We obtain that this
inequality is actually an equality, and therefore, P ∗i (Ai(j)) = vi(Ai(j)) for every j. In partic-
ular it holds for Si, i = 1, 2, and hence (b). This shows the Claim and the proof of Theorem
3 in case of identical grand coalitions.
Step 2: We now lift the restriction that N1 = N2 and allow different grand coalitions, N1 and
N2. Denote N = N1 ∪N2 and use the same technique we employed in the proof of Theorem
2: for i = 1, 2 and a positive M , define vMi over N . Recall that in v
M
i the worth of ` /∈ Ni
is −M , which is also her contribution to any coalition she does not belong to. Thus, vMi is
also convex. Furthermore, from the proof of Theorem 2 we know that when M is sufficiently
large, vM1 and v
M
2 are compatible if and only if v1 and v2.
Using Step 1, vM1 and v
M
2 are compatible as convex games. Thus, when M is large enough,
v1 and v2 are compatible, as desired.
Proof of Proposition 1 Denote v = v1 • ... • vK . Suppose first that v(N) = v1(N). We
show that C(v) = C(v1) ∩ ... ∩ C(vK). Assume that P ∈ C(v1) ∩ ... ∩ C(vK). Let S ⊆ N
and let S1, ..., SK be a partition of S to pairwise disjoint sets such that v(S) =
∑
i vi(Si).
One obtains, P (S) =
∑
i P (Si) ≥
∑
i vi(Si) = v(S). Furthermore, P (N) = v1(N) = v(N)
and therefore, P ∈ C(v). Now assume that P ∈ C(v). For every coalition S, v(S) ≥ vi(S),
implying P (S) ≥ v(S) ≥ vi(S) for every i = 1, ...,K. Since P (N) = v(N) = vi(N), P ∈ C(vi)
for every i = 1, ...,K.
As for the inverse direction, C(v) = C(v1)∩ ...∩C(vK) readily implies that v(N) = v1(N),
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which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2 We prove the theorem by induction on the number of games. First
assume that K = 2. We have
v˜1 • v˜2(S) = max
S1∩S2=∅
S1∪S2=S
[v˜1(S1) + v˜2(S2)]
= max
S1∩S2=∅
S1∪S2=S
 max
Si1∩S
j
1=∅
S11∪...∪Sn1 =S1
{v1(S11) + ...+ v1(Sn1 )}+ max
Si2∩S
j
2=∅
S12∪...∪Sn2 =S2
{v2(S12) + ...+ v2(Sn2 )}

= max
S1∩S2=∅
S1∪S2=S
max
Si1∩S
j
1=∅
S11∪...∪Sn1 =S1
max
Si2∩S
j
2=∅
S12∪...∪Sn2 =S2
[
v1(S
1
1) + ...+ v1(S
n
1 ) + v2(S
1
2) + ...+ v2(S
n
2 )
]
= max
Ti∩Tj=∅
T1∪...∪Tn=S
 max
S11∩S12=∅
S11∪S12=:T1
{v1(S11) + v2(S12)}+ ...+ max
Sn1 ∩Sn2 =∅
Sn1 ∪Sn2 =:Tn
{v1(Sn1 ) + v2(Sn2 )}

= max
Ti∩Tj=∅
T1∪...∪Tn=S
[v1 • v2(T1) + ...+ v1 • v2(Tn)]
= v˜1 • v2(S).
Now assume the induction hypothesis: the statement of the theorem holds for 2, ...,K−1
games. Let v := v1 • ... • vK−1. By using the induction hypothesis and by the semi-group
structure of (G(N), •) we have,
˜v1 • ... • vK = v˜ • vK
= v˜ • v˜K
= (v˜1 • ... • v˜K−1) • v˜K
= v˜1 • ... • v˜K .
Proof of Proposition 3 We need the following three lemmas.
Lemma 1 For any game v,
{P linear |P ≥ v} = {P linear |P ≥ v˜} = {P linear |P ≥ vc}.
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Proof This is an immediate result of the linearity of P and the definition of v˜ and vc. 
An immediate consequence of this lemma is the following one,
Lemma 2 For any game v,
Bv = Bv˜ = Bvc .
The third lemma is,
Lemma 3 For any game v,
Cc(v) 6= ∅ iff C(v˜) 6= ∅.
Proof By (4.4), Cc(v) 6= ∅ is equivalent to Bvc(N) ≤ vc(N). Since vc(N) = v˜(N), by
Lemma 2, Bvc(N) ≤ vc(N) is equivalent to Bv˜(N) ≤ v˜(N), which is, by (4.4), equivalent to
C(v˜) 6= ∅. 
Now we complete the proof of the proposition. We have,
v1, ..., vK are c-compatible ⇔ Cc(v1 • ... • vK) 6= ∅
⇔ C( ˜v1 • ... • vK) 6= ∅
⇔ B ˜v1•...•vK (N) ≤ ˜v1 • ... • vK(N)
⇔ Bv˜1•...•v˜K (N) ≤ ˜v1 • ... • vK(N)
⇔ Bv˜1•...•v˜K (N) ≤ v˜1, ..., v˜K(N)
⇔ C(v˜1 • ... • v˜K) 6= ∅
⇔ v˜1, ..., v˜K are compatible.
The first equivalence is the definition of compatibility. The second one is due to Lemma
3. The third equivalence is by (4.4), while the fourth and the fifth are due to Proposition
2. The last two equivalences result from (4.4) and the definition of compatibility, respectively.
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